Below is a list of the first 12 of the Dossier reports that have become available to the public.
1) Report 80, dated June 20, 2016
2) Report 86, dated July 26, 2015 (twenty-fifteen)
3) Report 94, dated July 19, 2016
4) Report 95, undated, but apparently written in late July 2016
5) Report 97, dated July 30, 2016
6) Report 100, dated August 5, 2016
7) Report 101, dated August 10, 2016
8) Report 102, dated August 10, 2016
9) Report 105, dated August 22, 2016
10) Report 111, dated September 14, 2016
11) Report 112, dated September 14, 2016
12) Report 113, dated September 14, 2016
According to the Horowitz report, the first time when FBI Headquarters received any of those Dossier reports was on September 19, 2016. That delivery comprised just six Dossier reports — 80, 94, 95, 100, 101, and 102 (Horowitz page 100). On that date, therefore, the series included a particular four-report gap — Reports 96, 97, 98 and 99. On some later, unknown date, Report 97 too was delivered to FBI Headquarters.
In this blog, I have speculated that all these 12 reports (except Reports 80 and 86) were delivered unofficially to the FBI Counterintelligence Chief promptly after their publication dates. For example, Report 94 was delivered to that Chief within a few days of its publication date — July 19 — but its delivery was not recorded according to FBI procedures. Report 94 was delivered officially — recorded according to FBI procedures — on September 19. On that official delivery date, however, the Counterintelligence Chief already had possessed the report unofficially since mid-July.
The reason for the abnormal delivery of Dossier reports was to enable the FBI to deny its knowledge of some of the reports.
For example, Steele finished writing Report 94 (and assigned that number to the report) on July 19. Within a few days, that report was delivered to the Counterintelligence Chief, but that delivery was not recorded according to FBI procedures.
By a different delivery method, Report 94 was delivered on July 28 to the Chief Division Counsel FBI New York Field Office (NYFO) — not to FBI Headquarters. This delivery to the NYFO was recorded according to FBI procedures. On July 28, therefore, the FBI could no longer deny that the FBI — in particular, the FBI NYFO — had received Report 94, but it still could deny that FBI Headquarters had received it. (When the NYFO received any Dossier reports, the NYFO simply hid them in a safe until further instructions were received from from FBI Headquarters.)
Later, in mid-September, someone decided that the current situation allowed Report 94 to be delivered officially to FBI Headquarters. This belated delivery was recorded in accordance with FBI procedures on September 19. From this latter date forward, FBI headquarters would have to acknowledge that it had been informed about Report 94.
The delivery of Report 97 was different. Like Report 94, it was delivered to the Counter-intelligence Chief promptly and unofficially. However, Report 97 was not delivered to the NYFO. Therefore, the FBI created no record at all that Report 97 had been delivered to any FBI office at all. Officially, Report 97 was delivered to the FBI the first time on September 19. Until that latter date, the FBI avoided creating any record indicating any FBI knowledge of the existence of Report 97.
I speculated in a previous blog article that the FBI might be more embarrassed by Report 97 (than, for example, by Report 94), because Report 97 indicated that Christopher Steele was obtaining information from sources with inside knowledge about Trump’s election-campaign staff. In particular, Report 97 claimed to be based partially on reports from “a Russian émigré figure close to the Republican US presidential candidate Donald Trump’s campaign team”. That phrase — which eventually might cause the public to suspect that the FBI was collecting information from inside Trump’s campaign staff — might have caused the decision in July 2016 to not send Report 97 to the NYFO.
By mid-September, however, the situation had changed. Now the FBI Headquarters was trying to overcome objections to its application for a FISA warrant in order to collect information about Trump’s supporters. Therefore, FBI Headquarters now had to receive officially some Dossier reports. In particular, Reports 97 now seemed to FBI Headquarters to be more useful than problematical. After all, the Russian émigré reported the following (emphasis added):
Speaking in confidence to a trusted associate in late July 2016, a Russian émigré figure close to the Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s campaign team commented on the fallout from publicity surrounding the Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mail hacking scandal. The émigré said there was a high level of anxiety within the TRUMP team as a result of various accusations levelled [sic] against them and indications from the Kremlin that President PUTIN and others in the leadership thought things had gone too far now and risked spiralling [sic]out of control.
Continuing on this theme, the émigré associate of TRUMP opined that the Kremlin wanted the situation to calm but for ‘plausible deniability’ to be maintained concerning its (extensive) pro-TRUMP and anti-CLINTON operations. S/he therefore judged that it was unlikely these would be ratcheted up, at least for the time being.
However, in terms of established operational liaison between the TRUMP team and the Kremlin, the émigré confirmed that an intelligence exchange had been running between them for at least 8 years. Within this context PUTIN’s priority requirement had been for intelligence on the activities, business and otherwise, in the US of leading Russian oligarchs and their families. TRUMP and his associates duly had obtained and supplied the Kremlin with this information.
Finally, the émigré said s/he understood the Kremlin had more intelligence on CLINTON and her campaign but he did not know the details or when or if it would be released. As far as ‘kompromat’ (compromising information) on TRUMP were concerned, although there was plenty of this, he understood the Kremlin had given its word that it would not be deployed against the Republican presidential candidate given how helpful and co-operative his team had been over several years, and particularly of late.
In mid-September, FBI Headquarters foresaw a need to use this information in order to obtain a FISA warrant. Therefore, FBI Headquarters belatedly arranged for Report 97 to be received in accordance with FBI procedures. Keep in mind, though, that the Counterintelligence Chief actually had received Report 97 already in July.” (Read more: Mike Sylvester, 10/10/2021) (Archive) (Copy of dossier saved to this website)